Flexible Rollback Recovery in Dynamic Heterogeneous Grid Computing by Samir Jafar et al.
Flexible Rollback Recovery in Dynamic
Heterogeneous Grid Computing
Samir Jafar, Axel Krings, Senior Member, IEEE, and Thierry Gautier
Abstract—Large applications executing on Grid or cluster architectures consisting of hundreds or thousands of computational nodes
create problems with respect to reliability. The source of the problems are node failures and the need for dynamic configuration over
extensive runtime. This paper presents two fault-tolerance mechanisms called Theft-Induced Checkpointing and Systematic Event
Logging. These are transparent protocols capable of overcoming problems associated with both benign faults, i.e., crash faults, and
node or subnet volatility. Specifically, the protocols base the state of the execution on a dataflow graph, allowing for efficient recovery in
dynamic heterogeneous systems as well as multithreaded applications. By allowing recovery even under different numbers of
processors, the approaches are especially suitable for applications with a need for adaptive or reactionary configuration control. The
low-cost protocols offer the capability of controlling or bounding the overhead. A formal cost model is presented, followed by an
experimental evaluation. It is shown that the overhead of the protocol is very small, and the maximum work lost by a crashed process is
small and bounded.
Index Terms—Grid computing, rollback recovery, checkpointing, event logging.
Ç
1I NTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
G
RIDand cluster architectures have gained popularity for
computationally intensive parallel applications. How-
ever, the complexity of the infrastructure, consisting of
computational nodes, mass storage, and interconnection
networks, poses great challenges with respect to overall
system reliability. Simple tools of reliability analysis show
that as the complexity of the system increases, its reliability,
and thus, Mean Time to Failure (MTTF), decreases. If one
models the system as a series reliability block diagram [30],
the reliability of the entire system is computed as the
product of the reliabilities of all system components. For
applications executing on large clusters or a Grid, e.g.,
Grid5000 [13], the long execution times may exceed the
MTTF of the infrastructure and, thus, render the execution
infeasible. As an example, let us consider an execution
lasting 10 days in a system that does not consider fault
tolerance. Under the optimistic assumption that the MTTF
of a single node is 2,000 days, the probability of failure of
this long execution using 100, 200, or 500 nodes is 0.39, 0.63,
or 0.91, respectively, approaching fast certain failure. The
high failure probabilities are due to the fact that, in the
absence of fault-tolerance mechanisms, the failure of a
single node will cause the entire execution to fail. Note that
this simple example does not even consider network
failures, which are typically more likely than computer
failure. Fault tolerance is, thus, a necessity to avoid failure
in large applications, such as found in scientific computing,
executing on a Grid, or large cluster.
The fault-tolerance mechanisms also have to be capable of
dealing with the specific characteristics of a heterogeneous
and dynamic environment. Even if individual clusters are
homogeneous, heterogeneity in a Grid is mostly unavoid-
able, since different participating clusters often use diverse
hardware or software architectures [13]. One possible
solution to address heterogeneity is to use platform-
independent abstractions such as the Java Virtual Machine.
However,thisdoesnotsolvetheproblemingeneral.Thereis
a large base of existing applications that have been
developed in other languages. Reengineering may not be
feasible due to performance or cost reasons. Environments
like Microsoft .Net address portability but only few scientific
applications on Grids or clusters exist. Whereas Grids and
clustersaredominatedbyunixoperatingsystems,e.g.,Linux
or Solaris, Microsoft .Net is Windows-centric with only
recent or partial unix support.
Besides heterogeneity, one has to address the dynamic
nature of the Grid. Volatility is not only an intracluster
issue, i.e., configuration changes within a cluster, but also
an intercluster reality. Intracluster volatility may be the
result of node failures, whereas intercluster volatility is
caused by network disruptions between clusters. From an
administrative viewpoint, the reality of Grid operation,
such as cluster/node reservations or maintenance, may
restrict long executions on fixed topologies due to the fact
that operation at different sites may be hard to coordinate. It
is usually difficult to reserve a large cluster for long
executions, let alone scheduling extensive uninterrupted
time on multiple, perhaps geographically dispersed, sites.
Lastly, configuration changes may be induced by the
application as the result of changes of runtime observable
quality-of-service (QoS) parameters.
To overcome the aforementioned problems and chal-
lenges, we present mechanisms that tolerate faults and
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tion of the application. We introduce flexible rollback
recovery mechanisms that impose no artificial restrictions
on the execution. They do not depend on the prefailure
configuration and consider 1) node and cluster failures as
well as operation-induced unavailability of resources and
2) dynamic topology reconfiguration in heterogeneous
systems.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we present the necessary background information
and related work. Next, in Section 3, we describe the
execution model considered. Two rollback-recovery proto-
cols are introduced in Sections 4 and 5. A theoretical
performance and cost analysis of these protocols is
presented in Section 6, followed by an experimental
validation of the theoretical results in Section 7. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section 8.
2B ACKGROUND
Several fault-tolerance mechanisms exist to overcome the
problems described in Section 1. Each fault in a system, may
it be centralized or largely distributed, has the potential for
loss of information, which then has to be reestablished.
Recovery is, thus, based on redundancy. Several redun-
dancy principles exit, i.e., time, spatial, and information
redundancy. Time redundancy relies on multiple execu-
tions skewed in time on the same node. Spatial redundancy,
on the other hand, uses physically redundant nodes for the
same computations. The final result is derived by voting on
the results of the redundant computations. However, there
are two disadvantages associated with redundancy:
1. Only a fixed number of faults can be tolerated
depending on the type of fault. This number of
redundant computations depends on the fault
model, which defines the degree of replication
needed to tolerate the faults assumed [18], [29].
The exact types of faults considered, e.g., crash fault
or omission fault, and their behavior will be
described later in Section 3.4.
2. The necessary degree of redundancy may introduce
unacceptable cost associated with the redundant
parallel computations and its impact on the infra-
structure [24]. This is especially true for intensive
Grid computations [2].
As a result, solutions based on replication, i.e., time and
spatial redundancy, are, in general, not suitable for Grid
computing where resources are preferably used for the
application itself.
In information redundancy, on the other hand, redun-
dant information is added that can be used during recovery
to reconstruct the original data or computation. This
method is based on the existence of the concept of stable
storage [10]. One has to note that stable storage is only an
abstraction whose implementation depends on the fault
model assumed. Implementations of stable storage range
from simple local disks, e.g., to deal with the loss of
information due to transient faults, to complicated hybrid-
redundancy management schemes, e.g., configurations
based on RAID technology [21] or survivable storage [32].
We consider two methods based on stable storage, i.e.,
logging and checkpointing.
2.1 Logging-Based Approaches
Logging [1] can be classified as pessimistic, optimistic, or
causal. It is based on the fact that the execution of a process
can be modeled as a sequence of state intervals. The
execution during a state interval is deterministic. However,
each state interval is initiated by a nondeterministic event
[27]. Now, assume that the system can capture and log
sufficient information about the nondeterministic events
that initiated the state interval. This is called the piecewise
deterministic (PWD) assumption [27]. Then, a crashed
process can be recovered by 1) restoring it to the initial
state and 2) replaying the logged events to it in the same
order they appeared in the execution before the crash. To
avoid a rollback to the initial state of a process and to limit
the amount of nondeterministic events that need to be
replayed, each process periodically saves its local state. Log-
based mechanisms in which the only nondeterministic
events in a system are the reception of messages is usually
referred to as message logging.
Examples of systems based on message logging include
MPICH-V2 [7], and FTL-Charm++ [8]. A disadvantage of
log-based protocols for applications with extensive inter-
process communication is the potential for large overhead
with respect to space and time, due to the logging of
messages.
2.2 Checkpointing-Based Approaches
Rather than logging events, checkpointing relies on
periodically saving the state of the computation to stable
storage [9]. If a fault occurs, the computation is restarted
from one of the previously saved states. Since the
computation is distributed, one has to consider the
tradeoff space of local and global checkpointing strategies
and their resulting recovery cost. Thus, checkpointing-
based methods differ in the way processes are coordinated
and in the derivation of a consistent global state. The
consistent global state can be achieved either at the time of
checkpointing or at the time of rollback recovery. The two
approaches are called coordinated and uncoordinated
checkpointing, respectively.
Coordinated checkpointing requires that all processes
coordinate the construction of a consistent global state
before they write the individual checkpoints to stable
storage. The disadvantage is the large latency and overhead
associated with coordination. Its advantage is the simplified
recovery without rollback propagation and minimal storage
overhead, since each process only needs to keep the last
checkpoint of the global “recovery line.” This kind of
protocol is used, e.g., in [26] and [33].
Uncoordinated checkpointing on the other hand assumes
that each process independently saves its state and a
consistent global state is achieved in the recovery phase
[10]. The advantage of this method is that each process can
make a checkpoint when its state is small. However, there
are two main disadvantages. First, there is a possibility of
rollback propagation which can result in the domino effect
[23], i.e., a cascading rollback to the beginning of the
computation. Second, due to the cascading effect, the
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to store multiple checkpoints.
A compromise between coordinated and uncoordinated
checkpointing is communication-induced checkpointing (CIC).
To avoid the domino effect that can result from indepen-
dent checkpoints of different processes, a consistent global
state is achieved by forcing each process to take additional
checkpoints based on some information piggybacked on the
application messages [3]. There are two main disadvantages
with this approach. First, it requires global rollback. Second,
it can result in the creation, and thus storage, of a large
number of unused checkpoints, i.e., checkpoints that will
never be used in the construction of a consistent global
state. An example of a system using this approach is
ProActive [4].
The essential issue in checkpointing and logging meth-
ods is to determine what information should be stored in
the checkpoint or log. This information will determine the
properties and suitable environment of the rollback, e.g.,
homogeneous versus heterogeneous system architecture or
static versus dynamic system configuration. A popular
checkpointing library used in systems like CoCheck [26],
MPICH-V2 [7], and MPICH-CL [7] is the Condor check-
point library [19]. In Condor, the information constituting
the checkpoint is the execution state of the process and,
thus, depends on the specific architecture of the platform
which executes the process. As a consequence, rollback is
feasible only on an identical platform and it requires the
creation of a replacement process. We will present below an
approach that overcomes both of these limitations, using an
abstract state of the execution represented by a dataflow
graph. This generalizes the approach used in the Satin
parallel programming environment [31], which will be
further discussed in Section 7.5.
3E XECUTION MODEL
The general execution model of large Grid applications can
be viewed as having two levels, as shown in Fig. 1. Level 0
only creates the “abstraction of the execution state” of the
application. This abstraction is then used by Level 1 to
actually schedule and, thus, execute the workload.
In Level 0, the program to be executed is viewed as an
abstraction that represents the state symbolizing the future
of an execution. By “future,” we mean the execution that
has not unfolded yet. Specifically, the input to the virtual
machine VM0 is the sequential input program supplemen-
ted by instructions for the runtime system that describe the
parallelism of the application. This is accomplished by two
primitives called Task_Creation and Data_Creation. Whereas
the first creates (but does not execute) an executable task,
the latter creates a shared data object. The sequential
program language, together with these primitives, consti-
tutes language L0. Note that L0 is now a language
supporting parallelism.
Level 1 takes the abstraction of Level 0 and schedules
tasks using the primitives Task_Export, Task_Import, and
Task_Execution. The sequential program language, together
with these primitives, constitutes the language L1. This
language encompasses the scheduling algorithm. Conse-
quently, Level 1 implements the dispatcher, whose deci-
sions (which will affect the future of the execution) will be
executed at Level 0. In the figure, this is indicated with the
arrow from the virtual machine VM1 to VM0. Note that
both levels represent the runtime system, however, whereas
the state of the execution is derived at Level 0, the decisions
about the future are made at Level 1.
The justification of the general execution model in Fig. 1
is that it is independent of the operating system and the
hardware architecture. Furthermore, it does not depend on
the number of resources, e.g., processors. As such, the
execution model is suitable for heterogeneous and dynamic
target systems, e.g., large clusters, Grid or peer-to-peer
systems. We will now explain the aforementioned abstrac-
tion of the execution state.
3.1 Dataflow Representation
The representation of the state of an execution is based on
the principle of dataflow [25]. Dataflow allows for a natural
representation of a parallel execution and can be exploited
for fault tolerance [20]. In a dataflow model, tasks, which
are the smallest units of execution, become ready for
execution upon availability of all their input data. The
dependencies among tasks are modeled in a dataflow
graph, which is defined as a directed graph G ¼ð V ;EÞ,
where V is a finite set of vertices and E is a set of edges
representing precedence relations between vertices. A
vertex vi 2V is either a computational task or a shared
data object. An edge eij 2E represents the dependencies
between vi and vj. Within the context of this research, G is a
dynamic graph, i.e., it changes during runtime as the result
of task creations/terminations as well as shared data object
creations/deletions.
The dynamic dataflow graph should not be confused
with the static precedence graphs often used in scheduling
theory. Here, as tasks, data objects and their dependencies
are created/deleted, the graph changes. Within the context
of the general execution model, graph G is the representa-
tion of the global system state, i.e., the “abstraction of the
execution state” shown in Fig. 1.
Whereas graph G is viewed as a single virtual
dataflow graph, its implementation is in fact distributed.
Specifically, each process Pi contains and executes a
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is defined by G ¼
S
Gi over all processes Pi. Note that
this also includes the information associated with depen-
dencies between Gi and Gj, i 6¼ j. This is due to the fact
that Gi, by the definition of the principle of dataflow,
contains all information necessary to identify exactly
which data is missing.
3.2 Work-Stealing
The runtime environment and primary mechanism for load
distribution is based on a scheduling algorithm called
work-stealing [11], [12]. The principle is simple: when a
process becomes idle it tries to steal work from another
process called victim. The initiating process is called thief.
Work-stealing is the only mechanism for distributing
the workload constituting the application, i.e., an idle
process seeks to steal work from another process. From a
practical point of view, the application starts with the
process executing main(), which creates tasks. Typically,
some of these tasks are then stolen by idle processes,
which are either local or on other processors. Thus, the
principal mechanism for dispatching tasks in the distrib-
uted environment is task stealing. The communication due
to the theft is the only communication between processes.
Realizing that task theft creates the only dependencies
between processes is crucial to understand the checkpoint-
ing protocol to be introduced later.
With respect to Fig. 1, work-stealing will be the
scheduling algorithm of preference at Level 1.
3.3 The KAAPI Environment
The target environment for multithreaded computations
with dataflow synchronization between threads is the
Kernel for Adaptive, Asynchronous Parallel Interface (KAAPI),
implemented as a C++ library. The library is able to
schedule programs at fine or medium granularity in a
distributed environment.
Fig. 2 shows the general relationship between processors
and processes in KAAPI. A processor contains one or more
processes. Each process maintains its own stack.
The lifecycle of a task in the KAAPI execution model is
depicted in Fig. 3 and will be described first from a local
process’ and then from a thief’s point of view in the context
of task stealing.
At task creation, the task enters state created. At this time,
it is pushed onto the stack. When all input data is available,
the task enters state ready. A ready-task which is on the top
of the stack can be executed, i.e., it can be popped off the
stack, thereby entering state executing. A task in the ready
state can also be stolen, in which case it enters the stolen
state on the local process, which now becomes a victim.
When the task is finished, either on the local process or a
thief, it enters state finished and proceeds to state deleted.
If a task has been stolen, the newly created thief process
utilizes the same model. In Fig. 2, the theft of task Ts on
Process 2 by Process i is shown, as indicated by the arrow.
Whereas this example shows task stealing on the same
processor, the concept applies also to stealing across
processors. On the victim, the stolen task is in state stolen.
Upon theft, the stolen task enters state created on the thief.
At this instant of time, the stolen task Ts and a task Tr
charged with returning the result are the only tasks in the
thief’s stack, as shown in the figure. Since a stolen task by
the definition of work-stealing is ready, it immediately
enters state ready. It is popped from the stack, thereby
entering state executing, and upon finishing, it enters state
finished. It should be noted that the task enters this state on
the thief and the victim. For the latter, this is after receiving a
corresponding message from the thief. On both processes,
the task proceeds to state deleted.
3.4 Fault Model
We will now describe the fault model that the execution
model is subjected to. The hybrid fault model described in
[29], which defines benign, symmetric, and asymmetric faults,
will serve as a basis. Whereas benign faults are globally
diagnosable and, thus, self-evident, symmetric and asym-
metric faults represent malicious faults which are either
consistent or possibly nonconsistent. In general, any fault
that can be detected with certainty can be dealt with by our
mechanisms. On one side, this includes any benign fault
such as a crash fault. On the other hand, this considers node
volatility [5], e.g., transient and intermittent faults of nodes.
It should be noted that results of computation of volatile
nodes, which rejoin the system, will be ignored.
In order to deal with symmetric or asymmetric faults, it
is necessary that detection mechanisms are available. Such
approaches have been shown in [17] and [16] and can be
theoretically incorporated in this work.
4T HEFT-INDUCED CHECKPOINTING
As seen in the previous section, the dataflow graph
constitutes a global state of the system. In order to use its
abstraction for recovery, it is necessary that this global state
also represents a consistent global state.
With respect to Fig. 1, we can capture the abstraction of
the execution state at two extremes. At Level 0, one assumes
the representation derived from the construction of the
dataflow graph, whereas at Level 1, the interpretation is
derived as the result of its evaluation, which occurs at the
time of scheduling.
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Fig. 3. Lifecycle of a task in KAAPI.
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capable of deriving a fault-tolerant coherent system state
from the interpretation of the execution state. Specifically,
we will define a checkpointing protocol called Theft-Induced
Checkpointing ðTICÞ.
4.1 Definition of a Checkpoint
As indicated before, a copy of the dataflow graph G
represents a global checkpoint of the application. In this
research, checkpoints are with respect to a process, and
consist of a copy of its local Gi, representing the process’
stack. The checkpointing protocol must ensure that check-
points are created in such a way that G is always a
consistent global application state, even if only a single
process is rolled back. The latter indicates the powerful
feature of individual rollbacks.
The checkpoint of Gi itself consists of the entries of the
process’ state, e.g., its stack. As such, it constitutes its tasks
and their associated inputs, and not the task execution
state on the processor itself. Understanding this difference
between the two concepts is crucial. Checkpointing the
tasks and their inputs simply requires to store the tasks
and their input data as a dataflow graph. On the other
hand, checkpointing the execution of a task usually
consists of storing the execution state of the processor as
defined by the processor context, i.e., the processor
registers such as program counters and stack pointers as
well as data. In the first case, it is possible to move a task
and its inputs, assuming that both are represented in a
platform-independent fashion. In the latter case, the fact
that the process context is platform dependent requires a
homogeneous system in order to perform a restore
operation or a virtualization of this state [28].
The jth checkpoint of process Pi will be denoted by CP
j
i .
Thus, the subscript denotes the process and the superscript
the instance of the checkpoint.
4.2 Checkpoint Protocol Definition
The creation of checkpoints can be initiated by 1) work-
stealing or 2) at specific checkpointing periods. We will
first describe the protocol with respect to work-stealing,
since it is the cause of the only communication (and thus,
dependencies) between processes. Checkpoints resulting
from work-stealing are called forced checkpoints. Then, we
will consider the periodic checkpoints, called local
checkpoints, which are stored periodically, after expiration
of predefined periods  .
4.2.1 Forced Checkpoints
The TIC protocol with respect to forced checkpoints is
defined in Fig. 4, showing events A through G for two
processes P0 and P1. Initially, P0 is executing a task from its
stack. The following sequence of events takes place:
1. A process P1 is created on an idle resource. If it
finds a process P0 that has a potential task to be
stolen, it creates a “theft” task Tt charged with
stealing a task from process P0. Before executing Tt,
process P1 checkpoints its state in CP0
1. Event A is
the execution of Tt which sends a theft request to P0.
2. Event B is the receipt of the theft request by P0.
Between events B and C, it identifies a task Ts and
flags it as “stolen by P1”. Between events B and C,
victim P0 is in a critical section with respect to theft
operations.
3. Between events C and D, it forces a checkpoint to
reflect the theft. At this time, P0 becomes a victim.
Event D constitutes sending Ts to P1.
4. Event E is the receipt of the stolen task Ts from P0.
Thief P1 creates entries for two tasks, Ts and Tr, in its
stack, as shown in Fig. 2. Task Tr is charged with
returning the results of the execution of Ts to P0 and
becomes ready when Ts finishes.
5. When P1 finishes the execution of Ts, it takes a
checkpoint and executes Tr, which returns the result
of Ts to P0 in event F.
6. Event G is the receipt of the result by P0.
4.2.2 Local Checkpoints
Local checkpoints of each process Pi are stored periodically,
after the expiration of the predefined period  . Specifically,
after the expiration of  , a process receives a signal to
checkpoint. The process can now take a checkpoint.
However, there are two exceptions. First, if the process has
a task in state executing, it must wait until execution is
finished.Second, if a process is inthe critical section between
events B and C, checkpointing must be delayed until exiting
the critical section. A checkpointing scenario comprising
local and forced checkpoints is shown in Fig. 5, where local
and forced checkpoints are shown unshaded and shaded,
respectively. Note that the temporal spacing of the two local
(unshaded) checkpoints on process P0 is at least  .
4.2.3 TIC Rollback
The objective of TIC is to allow rollback of only crashed
processes. A process can be rolled back to its last
checkpoint. In fact, for each process, only the last
checkpoint is kept. We now present a theorem that proves
that under TIC a global consistent state of the execution is
maintained.
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Fig. 4. TIC protocol: forced checkpoints.
Fig. 5. TIC protocol: local and forced checkpoints.
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rolled back, while guaranteeing a consistent global state of the
execution.
Proof. In general, to show that a set of checkpoints forms a
consistent system state, three conditions must be
satisfied [22]: IC1: There is exactly one recovery point
for each process. IC2: There is no event for sending a
message in a process P after its recovery point, whose
corresponding receive event in another process Q is
before the recovery point of Q. IC3: There is no event of
sending a message in a process P before its recovery point,
whose corresponding receive event in another process Q
is after the recovery point of Q. The scenarios represent-
ing conditions IC2 and IC3 are depicted in Fig. 6.
Proving that condition IC1 is met is trivial since TIC
stores only the last checkpoint in stable storage. In the
remainder of the proof of TIC, we will consider all
actions possible with respect to the events and check-
points shown in Fig. 5. This enumeration of events and
checkpoints is exhaustive.
Part 1: Let us assume that processes do not
communicate. It is well known that, under this
assumption, a global consistent state of an execution
is guaranteed implicitly by using local checkpoints.
Thus, in the absence of communication, only the local
process is affected by the rollback. In the context of
TIC, this means that a process that has not
participated in any communication since its last
checkpoint, neither as a sender nor receiver, can be
rolled back unconditionally to that checkpoint. In
Fig. 5, this scenario covers, for each checkpoint, the
time interval which starts at the time the checkpoint
is established until the next event or checkpoint. If
tðCP
j
i Þ denotes the time at which checkpoint CP
j
i is
established and tðXÞ denotes the time of event X, then
rollback during the following intervals will maintain a
consistent execution state: ½tðCP1
0Þ;tðBÞÞ, ½tðCP2
0Þ;tðDÞÞ,
½tðCP3
0Þ;tðGÞÞ, ½tðCP4
0Þ; Þ for process P0 and
½tðCP1
1Þ;tðAÞÞ, ½tðCP2
1Þ;tð½CP3
1ÞÞ, and ½tðCP3
1Þ;tðFÞÞ for
process P1. Note that the intervals are open to the
right, i.e., the right side of an interval is the time
before the event. Furthermore, symbol “ ”i n
½tðCP4
0Þ; Þ indicates the time of the next event or
checkpoint.
Part 2: Now, we prove that TICcan deal with rollback
that affects or is affected by communication, i.e., we need
to show how TIC effectively avoids inconsistency with
respect to conditions IC2 and IC3. Recall that the only
communication in the system is that due to task stealing,
i.e., three communications per theft, as shown in Fig. 5.
An attempt to communicate with a crashed process will
result in failure, indicated by an error code generated by
the transport layer, e.g., transport control protocol TCP.
This error code is used to initiate actions with respect to
IC2 and IC3.
We now present systematically, for each of the three
communications of TIC, the three possible fault cases as
they relate to the treatment of IC2, IC3, and a double
fault. The discussion is based on Fig. 5.
Communication A to B—the theft request:
1. If thief P1 crashes such that it rolls back past
event A, condition IC2 arises. This presents no
problem for the new process P0
1 (replacing the
crashed P1). P0
1 simply requests a theft from
another process. P0, on the other hand, will
detect the rollback upon unsuccessfully attempt-
ing to communicate with the crashed P1 (in
event D), where it receives an error code. P0,
thus, voids the theft, i.e., it unlabels task Ts and
takes another checkpoint reflecting its new state.
Note that this checkpoint is a new version of
the checkpoint between C and D.
2. If victim P0 crashes after event B but before CP2
0,
then condition IC3 is introduced. However, this
presents no problem for P1 who simply times out
while waiting for event E. P1 makes another
request.
3. A double fault implies that upon rollback of P1
as P0
1, the reinitiation of event A returns an
error. P0
1 will inquire about replacement P0
0 for
the nonresponding process P0.I fP0
0 has not
passed event B, then this constitutes a new theft
request. If P0
0 has been restarted from CP2
0, then
P0
0 will detect that the thief has also been rolled
back upon an unsuccessful event D and will
void the theft. This is exactly the action the
victim took in case 1.
Communication D to E—the actual theft:
1. If P0 fails after event D but before it could
checkpoint, then condition IC2 arises. The (rolled
back) victim will initiate another event D to the
same thief for the same request (indicated by
CP2
0). This is recognized by P1 as a duplicate and
is ignored.
2. If the thief crashes after the actual theft (event E)
butbeforeitwasabletocheckpoint,thencondition
IC3 arises. The thief is simply rolled back as P0
1 to
the initial checkpoint CP0
1 where it will rerequest a
task from P0 (event A). Victim P0, recognizing the
redundant request, changes the state of Ts from
stolen to ready, thus nullifying the old theft, and
treats the theft request as a new request.
3. The victim is rolled back past event D and finds
out the thief does not respond; a double fault.
Thus, victim P0
0 inquires about the replacement
process P0
1.I fP0
1 was initialized with CP1
1, it will
find out about the new P0
0 as the result of a
communication error at event A. If P0
1 was rolled
back with a checkpoint taken after event E, then it
takes a new CP2
0 to reflect that P0
1 is the rolled
back thief.
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victim:
1. If the thief crashes after event F, then condition
IC2 arises. Upon reinitiating event E, the victim
will simply ignore the duplication. Note that this
can only occur in the tiny interval after F and
before P1’s termination.
2. A crash of the victim after it has received the
result (event G) but before it can checkpoint will
result in condition IC3. This would stall the victim
after rollback to a state where the task is still
flagged as stolen, i.e., P0
0 would never receive the
result in event G. Therefore, as part of the rollback
procedure, the victim inspects the last checkpoint
for tasks that have been flagged stolen. If the
victim’s checkpoint contains references to a thief
P1 that is already terminated, it rolls back P0 on P0
0
using the checkpoint of P0 together with the
thief’s final checkpoint containing the result.
Thus, the rollback uses G0 and G1 (which contains
only Tr). On the other hand, if the last checkpoint
contains references to thieves that are still
executing, no action is required since the thief,
upon attempting to send the results to the old
process P0, will experience an error from the
transport layer and will inquire about P0
0.
3. If the thief is rolled back to CP3
1 and finds out
during event F that the victim has crashed as well,
it inquires about P0
0. P0
0 will have either been
initiated with CP2
0 or a checkpoint taken after
event D, say CP3
0. In the first case as the result of
the error during event D, P0
0 inquires about the
replacement victim and updates CP2
0.I nt h e
second case, it will be waiting for event G, which
is coming from the replacement thief. The thief
found out about P0
0 as a result of the communica-
tion error at event F during the attempt to reach
the old victim.
Part 3: So far, we have proven that by using TIC,
inconsistencies are avoided. However, it remains to be
established why the three forced checkpoints shown
(shaded) in Fig. 5 are necessary. Let CP0
1 and CP
f
1
denote the first and final checkpoint of a thief P1,
respectively. The initial checkpoint CP0
1 guarantees that
there exists at least one record of a theft request for a
thief that crashes. Thus, upon a crash, the thief is rolled
back on the new process P0
1. Without CP0
1, any crash
before a checkpoint on the thief would simply erase
any reference of the theft (event E) and would stall the
victim. The final checkpoint of the thief, CP
f
1 , is needed
in case the victim P0 crashes after it has received the
results from the thief, but before it could checkpoint its
state reflecting the result. Thus, if the victim crashes
between event G and its first checkpoint after G, then
the actions describing Communication F to G will ensure
the victim can receive the result of the stolen task.
It should be noted that the final checkpoint of the thief
cannot be deleted until the victim has taken a checkpoint
after event G, thereby checkpointing the result of the
stolen task. Lastly, the forced checkpoint of the victim
(between events C and D) ensures that a crash after this
checkpoint does not result in the loss of the thief’s
computation, i.e., there will be a record that allows the
victim’s replacement process to find the thief. t u
The actions described in the proof above constitute a new
generation of the protocol, i.e., the concept of a proactive
manager, as described in [14] and [15], has been eliminated.
It has been replaced with a passive name server imple-
mented on the same reliable storage system that facilitates
the checkpoint server.
5S YSTEMATIC EVENT LOGGING
Whereas the TIC protocol was defined with respect to
Level 1 in Fig. 1, we will now introduce a Level 0 protocol
called Systematic Event Logging ðSELÞ, which was derived
from a log-based method [1]. The motivation for SEL is
to reduce the amount of computation that can be lost,
which is bound by the execution time of a single failed
task.
1 We will later elaborate on the differences between
TIC and SEL in their analysis presented in Section 6.
In SEL, only the events relevant for the construction of
the dataflow graph are logged. Logging events for tasks are
their additions and deletions. Logging events of shared data
objects are their additions, modifications, and deletions. A
recovery consists of simply loading and rebuilding sub-
graph Gi associated with the failed process Pi from the
respective log.
The SEL protocol implies the validity of the PWD
hypothesis, which was introduced in Section 2.1. For the
hypothesis to be valid, the following two conditions
must hold:
. C1: Once a task starts executing, it will continue,
without being affected by external events, until its
execution ends.
. C2: The execution of a task is deterministic with
respect to the tasks and shared data objects that are
created. Note that this implies that the execution will
always create the same (isomorphic) dataflow graph.
At first sight, condition C1 may appear rather restrictive.
However, this is not the case for our application domain,
i.e., large parallel executions (see (1) below).
If all tasks of a dataflow graph obey conditions C1 and
C2, then all processes executing the graph will comply with
the PWD hypothesis. The idea behind the proof of this
theorem is simple. In the execution model, the execution of
tasks is deterministic, whereas the starting time of their
execution is nondeterministic. However, this implies, in
turn, that during the execution of a task in the execution
model, it itself will create the same sequence of tasks and
data objects.
In case of a fault, task duplication needs to be avoided
during rollback. Specifically, in the implementation, one has
to guarantee that only one instance of a any given task can
exist. In the absence of such guarantee, it could happen that
during rollback a task recreates other tasks or data objects
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depending on the timing of the fault, this could result in a
significant number of duplicated nodes, since each dupli-
cated task itself may be the initiator of a significant portion
of computation. In our implementation of SEL, duplication
avoidance is achieved using a unique and reproducible
identification method of all vertices in the graph.
6C OMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a cost model for the TIC and
SEL protocol. However, first we want to introduce the
necessary notation and analyze the general work-stealing
model.
Let Tsec be the time of execution of a sequential program
on a single processor. Furthermore, let T1 denote the time of
the execution of the corresponding parallel program on a
single processor, and let T1 be the theoretical execution
time of the application as executed on an unbounded
number of processors. Thus, T1 represents the execution
time associated with the critical path. It should be noted
that in large executions suitable for parallel environments,
we always have
T1   T1: ð1Þ
Next, let Tp be the execution time of a program on p
identical physical processors. Then, the execution of a
parallel program using work-stealing is bound by [11]
Tp  
T1
p
þ c1T1; ð2Þ
where constant c1 defines a bound on the overhead
associated with the critical path, including the scheduling
overhead. Furthermore, we have
T1   c1Tsec; ð3Þ
where c1 corresponds to the maximum overhead induced
by parallelism, excluding the cost of scheduling. The
constants c1 and c1 depend on the specific implementation
of the execution model and are a measure of the
implementation’s efficiency.
To show how little impact the term c1T1 of (2) has, one
should note that the number of thefts performed by any
process,
2 denoted by Ntheft, which introduce the scheduling
overhead hidden in c1 is small [11], [12], since
Ntheft   OðT1Þ: ð4Þ
Specifically, with T1   T1, we can approximate (2)
by Tp   T1
p .
6.1 Analysis of Fault-Free Execution
If we add a checkpointing mechanism, it is of special
interest to analyze its overhead associated with fault-free
execution, since the occurrence of faults is considered to be
the rare exception rather than the norm.
6.1.1 Analysis of TIC
In TIC, a checkpoint is performed 1) periodically for each
process, as dictated by period   and 2) as the result of work-
stealing. Let TTIC
P denote the execution of a parallel
program on p processors under TIC. Then
TTIC
P   Tp þ max
i¼1;...;p
OverheadTIC
i
  
; ð5Þ
where OverheadTIC
i denotes the total TIC checkpointing
overheadonprocessorPi.Thisoverheaddependsonthetotal
number of checkpoints taken on processor Pi and the
overhead of a single checkpoint. The maximal number of
checkpointsperformedbyaprocessoris½TTIC
P =  þ OðNtheftÞ ,
where TTIC
P =  indicates the number of checkpoints due to
period  andNtheftisthemaximalnumberoftheftsperformed
by any processor. Note that we use OðNtheftÞ, since, with
respect to Fig. 4, the numbers of checkpoints of the thief and
the victim are not equal.
The overhead of a single checkpoint in TIC is associated
with storing the collection of vertices in Gi and depends on
two parameters. First, it depends on the size of G.
Specifically, it depends on the number of tasks and shared
data objects, as well as the size of the latter. Second, it
depends on the time of an elementary access to stable
storage, denoted by ts.
The number of vertices in Gi has an upper bound of N1,
which denotes the maximum number of vertices in a path of
G [11]. The checkpoint overhead for processor Pi is, thus,
bound by
OverheadTIC
i ¼ TTIC
P =  þ OðNtheftÞ
  
fTIC
overheadðN1;t sÞ: ð6Þ
The function fTIC
overheadðÞ indicates the overhead associated
with a single checkpoint and depends only on G, or more
precisely N1, as well as ts.
6.1.2 Analysis of SEL
As defined in Section 5, in SEL, a log is performed for
each of the described events relevant for the construction
of G, i.e., 1) vertex creation, 2) shared data modification,
and 3) vertex deletion. Recall that, in G ¼ð V ;EÞ, a vertex
vi 2V is either a task or a shared data object.
Let TSEL
P denote the execution of a parallel program on p
processors under SEL. Then, TSEL
P can be expressed as
TSEL
P   Tp þ max
i¼1;...;p
OverheadSEL
i
  
: ð7Þ
This overhead depends on the total number of vertices in Gi
and the overhead of a single event log. The maximal
number of logs performed by a processor is jGij, i.e., the
number of vertices in Gi.
The overhead of a single event log in SEL is associated
with storing a single vertex vj of Gi and depends on two
parameters. Specifically, it depends on the size of vj and the
access time to stable storage ts. Note that if vj is a task, then
the log is potentially very small and of constant size,
whereas if it is a data object, then the log size is equal to that
of the object. The logging overhead for processor Pi is thus
bound by
OverheadSEL
i ¼j GijfSEL
overhead jvjj;t s
  
: ð8Þ
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overheadðÞ indicates the overhead associated
with a single log.
6.2 Analysis of Executions Containing Faults
The overhead associated with fault-free execution is the
penalty one pays for having a recovery mechanism. It
remains to be shown how much overhead is associated with
recovery as the result of a fault and how much execution
time can be lost under different strategies.
The overhead associated with recovery is due to loading
and rebuilding the affected portions of G. This can be
effectively achieved by regenerating Gi of the affected
processes. Thus, the time of recovery of a single process Pi,
denoted by t
recovery
i , depends only on the size of its
associated subgraph Gi, i.e., t
recovery
i ¼ OðjGijÞ. Note that
for a global recovery, as the result of the failure of the entire
application, this translates to maxðt
recovery
i Þ and not to P
t
recovery
i .
The way Gi is rebuilt for a failed process differs for the
two protocols. Under TIC, rebuilding Gi implies simply
reading the structure from the checkpoint. For SEL, this is
somewhat more involved, since now Gi has to be
reconstructed from the individual logs.
Next, we address the amount of work that a process can
lose due to a single fault. In TIC, this is the maximal
difference in time between two consecutive checkpoints.
This time is defined by the checkpointing period   and the
execution time of a task, since a checkpoint of a process that
is executing a task cannot be made until the task finishes
execution. In the worst case, the process receives a
checkpointing signal after   and has to wait for the end of
the execution of its current task before checkpointing. Thus,
the time between checkpoints is bound by   þ maxðciÞ,
where ci is the computation time of task Ti. But how bad can
the impact of ci be? In a parallel application, it is reasonable
to assume T1   T1. Since T1 is the critical path of the
application any ci   T1. As a result, one can assume ci to be
relatively small.
In SEL, due to its fine granularity of logging, the
maximum amount of execution time lost is simply that of a
single task. However, this comes at the cost of higher
logging overhead, as was addressed in (8).
6.3 Discussion
The overhead of the TIC protocol depends on the number
of theft operations and period  . To reduce the overhead,
one needs to increase  . However, this also increases the
maximum amount of computation that can be lost.
For SEL, the overhead depends only on the size of
graph G, i.e., its vertices vi which have to be saved. If one
wantstoreducetheoverhead,onehastoreducethesizeofG.
This, however, reduces the parallelism of the application.
Comparing the TIC and SEL protocol makes only
sense under consideration of the application, e.g.,
number of tasks, task size, or parallelism. If T1   T1,
given a reasonable value
3 for  , then the overhead of
TIC is likely to be much lower than that of SEL, i.e.,
given (6) and (8), ½TTIC
P =  þ OðNtheftÞ  is most likely
much smaller than jGij, thus more than compensating
for fSEL
overheadðjvjj;t sÞ <f TIC
overheadðN1;t sÞ, as will be confirmed
by the results in Section 7. The reduced overhead has
huge implication on the avoidance of bottlenecks in the
checkpointing server(s). For applications with large data
manipulations, TIC, with an appropriate choice of  ,
may be the only choice capable of eliminating storage
bottlenecks.
On the other hand, SEL a d d r e s s e st h en e e d so f
applications with low tolerance for lost execution time.
However, one has to analyze the bandwidth requirements
of logging in order to determine feasibility.
It should be emphasized that the advantage of the TIC
and SEL protocols is that they do not require replacement
resources for failed processes, e.g., the failed process can be
rolled back on an existing resource. This is due to the fact
that the state of the execution is platform and configuration
independent.
Lastly, we want to indicate that, even though the TIC
protocol has been motivated by CIC [3], TIC has multiple
advantages over CIC. First, unlike CIC, in TIC, only the last
checkpoint needs to be kept in the stable storage. This has
potentially large implications on the amount of data that
needs to be stored. Thus, the advantage of TIC is the
reduction of checkpointing data as well as the time it takes
to recover this data during rollback. The second significant
advantage is that in TIConly the failed process needs to be
rolled back. Note that, in CIC, all processes must be rolled
back after a fault.
7E XPERIMENTAL RESULTS
7.1 Application and Platform Description
The performance and overhead of the TIC and SEL
protocols were experimentally determined for the Quadratic
Assignment Problem (instance
4 NUGENT 22) which was
parallelized in KAAPI. The local experiments were con-
ducted on the iCluster2,
5 which consists of 104 nodes
interconnected by a 100-Mbps Ethernet network, each node
featuring two Itanium-2 processors (900 MHz) and 3 Gbytes
of local memory. The intercluster experiments were
conducted on Grid5000 [13], which consists of clusters
located at nine French institutions.
In order to take advantage of the distributed fashion of
the checkpoint, i.e., Gi, each processor has a dedicated
checkpoint server. This configuration has two advantages.
First, it reflects the theoretical assumptions in Section 6, and
second, the actual overhead of the checkpointing mechan-
ism is measured, rather than the overhead associated with a
centralized checkpoint server.
7.2 Fault-Free Executions
We will now investigate the overhead of the protocols in
fault-free executions, followed by executions containing
faults. Then, we show the results of a real-world example
executing on heterogeneous and dynamic cluster config-
urations. We conclude with a comparison of both protocols
with the closest counterpart, i.e., Satin [31].
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Fig. 7, where the number of parallel tasks generated during
execution grows as the size of tasks is reduced. Recall that
the number of tasks directly relates to the size of graph G,
which in turn has implication with respect to the overhead
of the protocols. The degree of parallelism increases
drastically for threshold 5 and approaches its maximum at
threshold 10.
Fig. 8 shows the execution times of the application for
different protocols in the absence of faults. Two observa-
tions can be made. First, the application scales with the
number of processors for all protocols. Second, there is very
little difference between the execution times of the protocols
for the same number of processors. In fact, the largest
difference among the executions was observed in the case of
120 processors and was measured at 7.6 percent. It is easy to
falsely conclude that, based on the small differences shown
in the scenarios in Fig. 8, all protocols perform approxi-
mately the same. The important measure of overhead of the
mechanism is the total amount of data associated with the
protocol that is sent to stable storage. This overhead is
affected by the total size and the number of messages. Due
to the efficient distributed configuration of the experiment,
which may not be realistic for real-world applications, this
overhead was hidden and, thus, does not show in the
figure. Fig. 9 addresses this cost, i.e., the cost of the fault-
tolerance mechanism that the infrastructure has to absorb,
and shows the total volume of checkpointing and logging
data stored. The advantages of TIC can be seen in the
significant reduction of data, which is most visible for larger
periods  . Furthermore, the data volume stays relatively
constant for different number of processors. This is due to
the fact that the number of thefts, and thus, theft-induced
overhead, is actually very small, as was explained in
Section 6.
7.3 Executions with Faults
To show the overhead of the mechanisms in the presence of
faults, we consider executions containing faults. First, we
want to measure the cost induced by the computation lost
due to the fault(s) and the overhead of the protocols.
Specifically, for each protocol, we show
Twithfault
p   T0
p
T0
p
; ð9Þ
where Twithfault
p is the time of execution in the presence of
faults and rollback, and T0
p is the time of a fault-free
execution.
Fig. 10 shows the measured cost using (9) for different
numbers of faults. The interpretation of T0
p is the execution
time of the application including the overhead of the
checkpointing or logging mechanism. One can observe that,
as the number of faults increases, the execution time grows
linearly. Note that, since the overhead of the protocols is
includedinT0
p,thevaluesdisplayedarethecomputationtime
lostduetothefaultsaswellastheoverheadofrollback,butdo
not contain the overhead of checkpointing or logging. As
expected, and discussed in Section 6.3, the computation lost
using SEL is lower than that under TIC, since in SEL, only
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Fig. 10. Overhead of rollback.
Fig. 9. Total volume of data stored.
Fig. 8. Execution times of protocols.
Fig. 7. Tasks and application granularity.
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the period in TICwas set at   ¼ 1 second, and the mean task
execution time was 0.23 second.
However, Fig. 10, with its interpretation of T0
p, does not
account for the overhead of checkpointing or logging.
This overhead was included in the measurement shown
in Fig. 11. Now, T0
p in (9) is the execution time of the
application without any fault-tolerance protocol, i.e.,
neither SEL nor TIC. The measurements reveal that the
actual overhead of SEL overshadows its advantages
shown in Fig. 10. Specifically, accounting for the overhead
of checkpointing (of TIC) and logging (of SEL), the real
advantage of lower checkpointing overhead of TIC
surfaces.
7.4 Application Executing on Heterogeneous and
Dynamic Grid
Next, we show an application of TIC in a heterogeneous
Grid. Four clusters of Grid5000 (geographically dispersed in
France) were used, utilizing different hardware architec-
tures. The execution clusters used AMD Opteron, Intel
Xeon, and PowerPC architectures, respectively, whereas the
stable storage cluster used Xeons. Fig. 12 summarizes
several experiments. First, the entire application was
executed on each of the three execution clusters using
30 computational nodes. The respective execution times are
shown in the three bars to the left.
Next, the application was executed on all three execution
clusters, using 10 nodes on each cluster. Thus, the total
number of processors available to the application was again
30. The fourth bar in Fig. 12 shows the time of the fault-free
execution (175 seconds) using no fault-tolerance protocol at
all. Next, the same experiment was repeated using the TIC
protocol with   ¼ 5 seconds. The result is shown in the fifth
bar peaked at 185 seconds. The difference in execution times
between this and the previous scenario is entirely due to the
overhead of TIC and its remote checkpointing. Finally, an
execution with fault in the PowerPC cluster was considered.
Specifically, after 50 percent of the application had
executed, a fault was injected that affected all 10 nodes of
the PowerPC cluster, i.e., the cluster was lost. The affected
part of the execution rolled back and finished execution on
the remaining 20 processors. One can see (in the bar to the
right indicating 216 seconds) that the execution tolerated the
cluster fault exceptionally well, resulting in an overall
execution time which was only 17 percent larger than that of
the fault-free case, even though one entire cluster was
permanently lost. Furthermore, the rollback was across
platforms, i.e., the computations of the failed cluster were
dynamically absorbed by the two remaining clusters using
different hardware architectures.
7.5 Comparison with Satin
A fault-tolerant parallel programming environment similar
to the approach presented above is Satin [31]. In fact, the
Satin environment follows the general execution model
presented in Fig. 1. However, the abstraction of the
execution state is a series-parallel graph, rather than the
dataflow graph. As such, Satin only addresses recursive
series-parallel programming applications. In Satin, fault-
tolerance is based on redoing the work lost by the crashed
processor(s). To avoid redundant computations, partial
results, which are stored in a global replicated table, can
later be reused during recovery after a crash.
To compare the performance of TIC with Satin, a
different application was used, i.e., a recursive application
resembling a generalization of a Fibonacci computation.
Fig. 13 shows the result of executions of both approaches for
different fault scenarios. Specifically, for each approach,
first, an execution without fault is shown. Next, a single
fault was injected after 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent
of the execution had completed. To eliminate the impact of
the different implementation languages and execution
environments on the execution times, i.e., C++/KAAPI
and Java/Satin, the measurements presented in the figure
are relative to the execution times in their respective
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Fig. 12. QAP application on Grid5000.
Fig. 13. Comparison of satin with KAAPI/TIC using 32 processors.
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significantly higher than that in KAAPI/TIC, which used
  ¼ 1 second. The reason is that, in Satin, all computations
affected by the fault are lost. In fact, the loss is higher the
later the fault occurs during the execution. This is not the
case in TIC w h e r et h em a x i m u ml o s si ss m a l l ,i . e . ,
  þ maxðciÞ, as was shown in Section 6.2. Thus, TIC
overcomes this performance deficiency of Satin.
On the other hand, the TICprotocol is pessimistic in the
sense that processes are always checkpointed to anticipate a
future failure. The result is that for fault-free executions the
Satin approach has lower overhead than TIC. However, as
was shown in Section 7.2, the overhead of TIC is very
small.
For applications with small computation times (linear or
quasilinear), Satin also tends to perform better than TIC.
The reason is that the time to recompute solutions under
Satin may be less than the overhead associated with writing
checkpoints to stable storage. However, such applications
are difficult to parallelize due to the low computation/
communication ratio.
8C ONCLUSIONS
To overcome the problem of applications executing in large
systems where the MTTF approaches or sinks below the
execution time of the application, two fault-tolerant proto-
cols, TIC and SEL, were introduced. The two protocols
take under consideration the heterogeneous and dynamic
characteristics of Grid or cluster applications that pose
limitations on the effective exploitation of the underlying
infrastructure. The flexibility of dataflow graphs has been
exploited to allow for a platform-independent description
of the execution state. This description resulted in flexible
and portable rollback recovery strategies.
SEL allowed for rollback at the lowest level of
granularity, with a maximal computational loss of one task.
However, its overhead was sensitive to the size of the
associated dataflow graph. TIC experienced lower over-
head, related to work-stealing, which was shown bounded
by the critical path of the graph. By selecting an appropriate
application granularity for SEL and period   for TIC, the
protocols can be tuned to the specific requirements or needs
of the application. A cost model was derived, quantifying
the induced overhead of both protocols. The experimental
results confirmed the theoretical analysis and demonstrated
the low overhead of both approaches.
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